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: recovering the secret key for a 256-bit curve
recovering the secret key for a 256-bit curve
2014-03-13 17:36:34.725224+01 by
Dan Lyke
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Cryptology ePrint Archive: Report 2014/161
Abstract: We apply the Flush-Reload side-channel attack based on cache hits/misses to extract a small amount of data from OpenSSL ECDSA signature requests. ... In particular we show that with as little as 200 signatures we are able to achieve a reasonable level of success in recovering the secret key for a 256-bit curve.
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