2020-12-29 17:50:08.026205+01 by Dan Lyke 3 comments
With all of the defensive coding and comprehensive test coverage necessary to work in modern interpreted (or semi-interpreted, as in Objective-C) languages, the security "failures"/implications of C are really failures of the containing run-time environment.
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comments in ascending chronological order (reverse):
#Comment Re: With all of the defensive coding and made: 2020-12-30 03:07:26.84645+01 by: ebwolf
How is this different from "It works on my machine"?
#Comment Re: With all of the defensive coding and made: 2020-12-30 20:06:16.810722+01 by: Dan Lyke
I think it's just an acknowledgement that interpreted languages are largely just a more complex run-time environment, and an off-loading of cognitive load for correctness from the compiler to the programmer because correctness isn't as "important".
#Comment Re: With all of the defensive coding and made: 2021-01-04 08:24:43.488666+01 by: spc476
C's failures are just two---the lack of automatic bounds checking for arrays, and the C Standard committee's insistence that 1's complement and sign-magnitude CPUs are still a thing (i.e. that signed overflow should never happen).